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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The court referred to other authorities,8 wherein escape was defined as
voluntary departure without force from legal cotody, to support its in-
terpretation of the statute in question. The court shed light on a hid-
den ground for its decision, when it stated that the defendant's right to
freedom was absolute. The prosecution argued that even if the defend-
ant was illegally confined, he should have used a writ of habeas corpus to
secure -his release. The court agreed that if the defendant had applied
for such a writ it could not have been denied, but it went on to say that
the defendant was not limited to this remedy. Thus the defendant was
allowed to use self-help to perpetrate his escape.
The Ohio court, in following cases from other jurisdictions, seems to
ignore the policy considerations inherent in this problem. In permitting
the use of self-help, the court is placing an undue hardship and hazard
on the guards of our penal institutions. The court is accordingly weaken-
ing our legal system by allowing an illegally held prisoner to escape, rather
than compelling him to rely on the legal process of habeas corpus, which
was designed to remedy cases where a person is illegally confined.
The writer submits that -because of these unresolved questions of pub-
lic policy, the court was in error in ruling as it did. Had the court given
these policy arguments proper consideration, it might well have reached
a different conclusion. The escapee in this case had a legal solution to his
dilemma by the use of habeas corpus. During the feudal era the doctrine
of self-help was necessary, since the writ of habeas corpus was not well
defined. But today a dynamic legal system has reached a point where
self-help is no longer desirable in this area. The prisoner should have
been forced to rely on habeas corpus for his release. The continued use
of self-help in effecting escape from illegal confinement subverts the
constitutional and statutory provisions which protect the rights of the
individual.
SHELDON P WEITZMAN
TRUSTS- VALIDITY OF REVOCABLE TRUSTS -
VESTED REMAINDER
A trust agreement was executed by which the settlor was to receive
the income for life, and which designated the First National Bank of Cin-
cinnati as trustee. The "settlor reserved the power to revoke, alter or
amend the trust. Upon 'the death of the settlor, all of the trust assets were
to be delivered to the serdor's sister. No alternate beneficiary was named.
* 16 OHio JUR, Escape and Rescue § 3 (1931). "In such a case the right to liberty
is absolute, and he who regains it, is not guilty of the technical offense of escape."
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Several months later the settlor also executed a will in which she be-
queathed all her property to her sister; no alternate legatee was named.
The power to revoke was never exercised and the beneficiary pre-
deceased the settlor. The First National Bank, in its capacities of trustee
and executor of the wills of the settlor and the beneficiary, brought an
action in probate court to secure directions in the performance of its
duties. The residuary legatee under the will of the beneficiary contended
that the trust created a vested interest in the remainderman, which was
part of her estate. The heirs of the settlor contended that the remainder-
man did not take a vested interest, because the interest was subject to
the conditions precedent of non-revocation and survival of the remainder-
man. Since the remainderman predeceased the settlor, the settlor's heirs
argued that a resulting trust arose in their favor. The probate court held
that the trust corpus and accumulated income should be distributed to the
estate of the beneficiary, but that the devise in the settlor's will had
lapsed' and the property mentioned in the will should be distributed to
the heirs of the settlor. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the
probate court and the settlor's heirs appealed the ruling concerning the
distribution of the trust estate to the supreme court. The Supreme Court
of Ohio disposed of two related problems in unanimously affirming the
decision of the lower courts.2
The underlying issue was whether a purported trust, in which the
setrtlor reserves both the power to revoke and the life income, constitutes
a mere agency because of the retention of control. If it were an agency,
legal and equitable title would have remained in the alleged settlor, and
the corpus of the purported trust would constitute part of her estate. The
heirs of the settlor, however, conceded the existence of a valid trust in the
instant case. The court emphatically observed that this concession in-
dicated that the law of revocable trusts in Ohio is finally consistent with
the law of all other states.2
Ohio has had a turbulent history of decisions concerning revocable
,trusts. In Worthmgton v Redkey,4 the supreme court held that a pur-
ported trust which reserved the right to revoke was void. After the
passage of an amendment to the statute of frauds,5 the supreme court
'See OH-o REv. CODE § 2107.52. The residuary legatee does not qualify under
the anti-lapse statute.
'First Nat'l Bank v. Tenney, 165 Ohio St. 513, 138 N.E.2d 15 (1956)
*4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 994 (1948); 1 ScoTt, TRUSTS § 57.1 (2nd
ed. 1956); 1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 57 (1935).
'86 Ohio St. 128, 99 N.E. 211 (1912).
5O-o Rxv. CODE § 1335.01. This section now reads: "All deeds of gifts and con-
veyance of real property or personal property made in trust for the exclusive use of
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tended to sustain the validity of revocable trusts.6 Later, a decision up-
held a revocable trust which was executed before the passage of the
amendment, on the basis of common law trust principles.7 However,
after 1940 it seemed that the Ohio courts might not sustain revocable
trusts. In the 1941 case of Woodside Co. v. Norton,8 dicta indicated that
the court would not uphold revocable trusts. In -the same year in Central
Trust Co. v. Watt,9 three judges dissented on the ground that revocable
trust created a mere agency. In the same case one judge concurred solely
-because the interested parties had accepted the trust agreement for thirty
years. Further confusion was added to the general controversy in two
cases which involved a widow's claim to her dower interest in the trust
property. These claims were granted because the settlor had not parted
absolutely with dominion over the property.10 It would seem that the
court's statement- in the present case - that the rule against accepting the
validity of revocable trusts has been laid to rest 11 - -better represents a
desirable rule for future similar cases than it does an accurate summation
of prior case law. Nonetheless, the present case clearly does establish in
Ohio the validity of a trust which reserves the life benefits and the power
of revocation in the settlor.
Having established the existence of an inter vivos trust, the court
turned to the question of the nature of the interest which was created in
the remainderman. Does such a trust create a presently vested interest in
the remainderman which is subject to defeasance by revocation? Or is it
a gift of the remainder which is not presently vested because it is subject
to the conditions precedent of non-revocation -by the settlor as well as
survival of the remainderman? The heirs of the settlor contended that
since the remainderman predeceased the settlor, a resulting trust arose in
their favor. However, the court held that the remainderman took a vested
interest subject to defeasance by revocation, stressing the absence of a
condition precdent which must be met before the benefits of the interest
may be enjoyed. This interest was bequeathed by her and her legatee took
the person making same are void, but the creator of a trust may reserve to hmself
any use of power, induding the power to alter, amend, or revoke such trust,
and such trust is valid to all persons. "
' Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 135 Ohio St. 328, 21 N.E.2d 119 (1939); Union
Trust Co. v. Hawkins, 121 Ohio St. 159, 167 N.E. 389 (1929).
" Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N.E.2d 627 (1938).
8138 Ohio St. 469, 35 N.E.2d 777 (1941).
139 Ohio St. 50, 38 N.E.2d 185 (1941).
10Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (1947); Bolles v. Toledo Trust
Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944).
'First Nat'l Bank v. Tenney, 165 Ohio St. 513, 515, 138 N.E.2d 15, 18 (1956).
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subject to the same condition.12 Since the power of revocation was never
exercised the vested interest became indefeasible in the legatee.
Although the Ohio Supreme Court has never faced this exact issue be-
fore, this result was anticipated.' 3 Also, as other states have not ruled on
this particular point, the court looked to similar situations in which vested
remainders are created subject to complete defeasance in legal estates.14
In addition, it was noted that the law favors early vesting.' 5 Since a trust
speaks from the date of execution, it seems logical that a power of revoca-
tion should operate as a condition subsequent upon the equitable interest
of the beneficiary. To have held otherwise would have permitted the
settlor's heirs to prevail even though the settlor failed to exercise the
power of revocation.
NoRmAN S. JEAvoNs
See OHIO REV. CODE § 2131.04. Remainders are devisable.
134 BOGERT, TRusTS AND TRusTEEs § 994 (1948); 1 ScoTr, TRusTS §§ 57.1, 84,
86.1 (2nd ed. 1956); Goldman, Rights of the Spouse and the Creditor in Inter
Vivos Trusts, 17 U. CIN. L. REV. 3 (1948).
" First Nat'l Bank v. Tenney, 165 Ohlo St. 513, 517, 138 N.E.2d 15, 19 (1956)
'See Ohio Nat'l Bank v. Boone, 139 Ohio St. 361, 40 N.E.2d 149, 144 A.LR.
1150 (1942).
19571
